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Article 2

Unveiling Justice Blackmun
Harold Hongju Koh †
I am delighted to have attended this illuminating
symposium about Linda Greenhouse’s wonderful book,
Becoming Justice Blackmun. 1 The symposium covered two
distinct subjects. The first is the story of Justice Blackmun,
the Justice he became, and how we came to understand him.
The second is the story of how the public learns about our
Constitution and the Supreme Court Justices who interpret it.
This Article focuses on the relationship between those subjects:
how the process of unveiling Justice Blackmun and his work
can help us as Americans to understand better our own
Supreme Court.
One could imagine at least three different attitudes
toward how the public should learn about its Supreme Court.
First, one could envision the mindset that the Court should be
a total black box before, during and after the time a case is
decided. Imagine a scenario where no Justices reveal how they
might vote on a case before they vote, where none of their
discussions are ever revealed while they are still on the bench,
and where afterwards all their papers are burned. All we
would ever know about the case would have to be gleaned from
the public documents and argumentation. Like the parol
evidence rule, this approach would prevent observers from
looking outside the four corners of the document (in this case,
the published opinion) to determine its meaning.
The
advantage of this scheme would be clarity; the disadvantage
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Dean and Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International
Law, Yale Law School; Law Clerk to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1981-82; Interviewer
and Editor, The Justice Harry A. Blackmun Supreme Court Oral History Project, 199495. This Article is a lightly edited and footnoted version of remarks delivered at the
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would be limiting our understanding of the Court’s workings to
a small fraction of the available evidence.
In contrast, a second mindset might take the opposite
approach—total disclosure—whereby reporters might quiz
Justices intensively and expect them to answer substantive
questions about a case well in advance of its argument, where
all deliberations would be made transparent, and where after
the fact, as soon as a decision came down, the entire file and all
the correspondence would be released immediately for public
examination. Such a total disclosure regime would almost
surely have a chilling effect on the Court’s deliberative decision
making, by likely diminishing robust and honest discussion of a
case while it was still pending.
So instead, imagine a third approach, a compromise
between regimes of total nondisclosure and total disclosure,
which would counsel a policy of nondisclosure about
deliberations before a case is argued and during the decision
making process, but permit some disclosure about internal
decision making processes at some point after the decision is
handed down. Handled properly, such a third approach might
well strike the best balance between protecting the Court’s
deliberations and allowing the Court’s workings to be more
comprehensible to the American people. Finding the right
balance raises the questions of how much disclosure after the
fact would be the right amount, and at what point in time that
post hoc disclosure should be made.
Seeking to strike the right balance between disclosure
and nondisclosure is where the fascinating story of Justice
Blackmun’s papers comes in. Through an accident of history, I
was privileged to become part of the deliberative process
regarding the unveiling of Justice Blackmun’s papers. After
he, his family, and a number of his former law clerks discussed
the process of disclosure over a number of months, he made two
important decisions. First, he agreed to what eventually
became thirty-eight hours of videotaped interviews, The Harry
A. Blackmun Supreme Court Oral History Project, 2 which we
conducted from July 6, 1994—the day he stepped off the
bench—until December 13, 1995. Second, in his retirement, he
executed a deed of gift that delivered all of his papers,
2
The Justice Harry A. Blackmun Oral History Project: Interviews with
Justice Blackmun, conducted by Professor Harold Hongju Koh, Yale Law School, July
6, 1994-Dec. 13, 1995, at 146, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cocoon/blackmunpublic/page.html?FOLDERID=D0901&SERIESID=D09 [hereinafter Oral History].
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including the Oral History transcripts and all of the videotapes,
to the Library of Congress as of the fifth anniversary of his
death, a date that turned out to be March 4, 2004.
How, precisely, did Justice Blackmun’s papers end up
getting to the Library of Congress? How were these decisions
about disclosure and public access made, and were the right
decisions made at the right time? These are the questions this
Article will address.
I.

THE MAKING OF THE BLACKMUN ORAL HISTORY

As our ninety-ninth Supreme Court Justice, Harry
Blackmun sat on 3,875 cases in the seat occupied by Justices
Story, Holmes, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Goldberg, Fortas, and
now Breyer. His personal papers now number some half
million items, including thirty-eight hours of Oral History,
which now sit in some 1,600 boxes on more than 600 feet of
shelf space in the Library of Congress. As a whole, the
Blackmun papers really tell not one, but three, distinct stories.
The first is the story of the workings of the United
States Supreme Court during the last quarter of the twentieth
century. Justice Blackmun not only maintained every scrap of
paper relevant to the Court’s decision making, he also
maintained them—with the help of his brilliant and devoted
assistant Wanda Martinson—in utterly meticulous order, thus
creating the authoritative paper archive of the Court’s inner
workings during this period.
Linda’s book graphically
demonstrates what a very able journalist and historian can do
by working assiduously with these materials. There is no case
decided during this period that cannot be reconstructed or
understood in a different light, so long as one is willing to put
in the time. For Supreme Court lawyers, the Blackmun papers
represent a treasure trove, the ultimate legal archaeological
dig.
The second story the papers tell is of one man’s journey
through twenty-four testing years on the Court. The papers
describe, in Justice Blackmun’s own words, how he experienced
and understood the transformational process of moving from
one political wing of the Court to the other—or, as he preferred
to say, “the Court shifting beneath him” 3 —a path followed in
subsequent years, to greater and lesser extents, by such
3
Fred Barbash & Al Kamen, Blackmun Says “Weary” Court Is Shifting
Right, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1984, at A1.
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colleagues and successors as Justices John Paul Stevens, David
Souter, and Anthony Kennedy.
The third and final story found in these papers tracks
how one individual Justice’s life journey contributed to the
parallel journey of the Court and the Constitution as pivotal
institutions in American political and social life. Often, these
three narratives intertwine in unexpected ways. For me, one of
the most enjoyable and exciting elements of conducting the
Oral History was hearing how Justice Blackmun’s own memory
tied together historical events whose connection I had
previously never understood.
How many of us knew, for example, that Chief Justice
Burger delayed the release of the decision in Roe v. Wade 4 until
January 1973 so it would not come down until after President
Richard Nixon’s second inauguration? Or that when Roe
actually came down, it happened to fall on the day that former
President Lyndon B. Johnson died, so the case got virtually no
press attention that day? The newspapers did not begin to
comprehend the significance of the ruling until many weeks
later. These are not the kind of connections between public
events that one usually makes when one reads these landmark
Supreme Court cases in a law school casebook.
Or, to take one of my favorite Oral History moments:
one reason that the announcement of Justice Blackmun’s
nomination to the Supreme Court was delayed was that at the
same moment the nomination was being considered, Apollo 13
was caught on the other side of the moon, a story beautifully
told in Ron Howard’s later movie of the same name. So
President Nixon told Justice Blackmun that he would not be
able to announce the nomination until Apollo 13 was either lost
or came back safely, and advised him to keep his pending
nomination quiet until then. In the Oral History, Justice
Blackmun tells the hilarious story of boarding his flight back
from Washington to Minnesota, after having received President
Nixon’s admonition of secrecy. As the Justice tells it:
I got to the airport just in time, and went in, sat on an aisle seat
back in the steerage. Pretty soon I was putting my bag underneath
the seat in front of me, and a couple of feet came up, stomped right
by me and looked to the other side. The occupant of the seat on the
other side said to the man standing there, “Who is this guy,
Blackmun, whose photograph is in today’s paper?”

4

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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And the answer was, “Oh, he’s just another old conservative.” And
here I was underneath. I could tell who it was. What do I do? Do I
stay underneath, or do I make my presence known? I finally pulled
on his trouser leg, and said,
“Walter, I’m here.” It happened to be Senator [Walter F.] Mondale
[of Minnesota, later Vice President of the United States].
Then the hostess said, “Will everyone please take his or her seat?
Senator Mondale, will you please return to your seat?”
He said, “Harry, I’ll be right back.” Sure enough, as soon as we were
airborne he came back. . . . [T]he senator came back and said, “I
want you to know that I’m all for you, but I can’t always say so in
public.”
I said, “Walter, I understand perfectly well.” So it worked. 5

Exactly how did Justice Blackmun decide to engage in
this exercise of disclosure? He started thinking about this
toward the end of his active time on the Court, around 1993,
after a number of authors had contacted him asking to write
his authorized biography. In trying to decide what to do, he
asked a number of his former clerks, including myself, for
counsel. At one point he asked me, “Do you think any of my
law clerks would want to write my biography?” This was
around the time when Professor John Jeffries came out with
his biography of Lewis Powell, for whom he had clerked, 6 and
Gerry Gunther of Stanford had recently published his
magisterial biography of the judge for whom he had clerked,
Learned Hand. 7 Despite the excellence of these two volumes, I
said to the Justice something that I believed then and now:
that, as a clerk, it is hard to write a credible and objective
biography, because you simply cannot be objective about your
boss. If, for example, you say that your Justice is wonderful,
everybody will think that you have whitewashed his life and
career. But if you say that your Justice was a jurist with the
inevitable human warts and flaws, you look like an ingrate. It
is hard for any clerk to win under these circumstances. And so
I told him that I did not believe it was wise for him to ask any
clerk, even those who were law professors, or historically
minded, to take up this project.

5
6
7

Oral History, supra note 2, at 173.
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (1994).
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).
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Instead, we turned to a different idea: doing an oral
history. We learned that the Federal Judicial Center and the
Supreme Court Historical Society have a policy of financially
supporting an oral history for any Supreme Court Justice
willing to have one done, but that very few Justices actually
take advantage of this offer. Justice Thurgood Marshall had
one done, with his former clerk, my Yale Law School colleague
Stephen Carter, serving as interviewer, but it lasts only about
eight hours and ended up focusing far more on Justice
Marshall’s time as a litigator and Solicitor General than on his
time on the Supreme Court. Justice Lewis Powell gave a brief
oral history to Professor John Jeffries, but then Jeffries’s own
biography overtook the oral history in scope and magnitude.
Justice William Brennan also apparently gave a very brief oral
history, which has become part of a much larger authorized
biography project being conducted by Stephen Wermiel.
Against this background, I suggested to Justice
Blackmun that he consider doing an oral history, rather than a
biography, as a way of telling his own story in his own words.
Characteristically, he responded that he had to think on it, and
that he was reluctant to have anyone “go to all that trouble.”
While we were having this discussion in the fall of 1993,
unbeknownst to me, he was also thinking about his own
retirement, which he finally announced the following spring.
His decision to retire, I think, finally moved him to begin the
Oral History. He knew that he would be moving his chambers
and organizing his files for posterity, and conducting the Oral
History made good sense as a way of ordering that process.
One of the first questions that arose was whether we
should use audiotape or videotape to record the Oral History.
All previous Supreme Court oral histories had been recorded on
audiotape, some long before adequate videotape technology had
even been developed. Justice Blackmun, however, was an
excellent candidate for videotaping, because he had already
done a number of video interviews on national news programs
such as ABC’s Nightline, in which he came across as the
humane and kindly person he was. Once again, the frugal
Justice Blackmun initially hesitated, fearing that “videotape
would be too expensive, and I don’t want to create a bother.”
But we soon learned that there was an excellent videotape
facility right in the new Federal Judicial Center building, just a
few minutes’ walk from his new office, where we could record
with little fuss, and in the same setting for all interviews.
What finally sealed the decision in favor of videotape was the
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fortuity of my watching the Disney animated movie The Little
Mermaid one weekend with my daughter. During the trailer
for the movie, the announcer said that “videotaped movies are
evergreen.” When I related this to Justice Blackmun the next
week, he smiled and—perhaps thinking of Minnesota forests—
said: “Evergreen. I like that.” And with that, the decision in
favor of videotaping was made.
This decision, I think, turned out to be a happy one.
During the taping, things that the Justice said with a visual
attached came across as more heartfelt, more profound and
simply more human than they could ever have with simple
audio or a written transcript. After thirty-eight hours, we even
closed the Oral History with this winsome colloquy, which
could never have been fully captured on audio:
H[arold] K[oh]: Thank you very much, Mr. Justice [for these
interviews].
H[arry] A[.] B[lackmun]: You didn’t ask me to wiggle my ears.
HK: Will you do it?
HAB: I can.
HK: Okay.
HAB: And that has been a great attribute for little children, because
if they come to visit the chambers, and I wiggle my ears at them,
they’re much more fascinated with that than they are with what’s
hanging on the wall or the history of the Court or all those things.
So I wiggle my ears in farewell.
HK: Mr. Justice, had this not been on videotape, we could never
have captured you wiggling your ears. Thank you so much, Mr.
Justice. It’s been great. 8

In hindsight, it is even more fortunate that we chose to
record Justice Blackmun’s Oral History on video because those
tapes have now been digitized and are publicly available on the
Internet. And so, for generations to come, the man I remember
as Justice Blackmun will be “evergreen” to any student who
wants to see what the Justice was really like at the end of his
career.
Unexpectedly, the decision to videotape also jumpstarted the beginning of the Oral History tapings. Upon
retiring, Justice Byron White had dismantled his chambers
8

Oral History, supra note 2, at 483.
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and moved out of the Supreme Court building and into the new
Federal Judicial Center building next to Union Station in
Washington, D.C. It soon became clear that upon retiring,
Justice Blackmun would be obliged to do the same. I told him
that I thought it was a shame that nobody would ever see his
judicial chambers as they were arranged during his twentyfour years on the Court as an active Justice. He quickly
decided to start the Oral History sooner rather than later, so
that we could capture his office on video. And so, on July 6,
1994, just one week after his last active term on the Court
ended, we taped the first few Oral History sessions in the
Justice’s chambers, the Supreme Court courtroom, and in the
Justices’ library where he often worked. We began filming on
the day before his active chambers were broken down, and we
filmed him in the courtroom, talking about his experiences
while sitting there.
During the taping he filled with emotion, recalling all of
the years that he had sat on the bench in that courtroom.
Deliberately, the camera focused entirely on Justice Blackmun
during the interview; as interviewer, I am heard only as a voice
asking him the questions. Once we began taping, a number of
people, including his secretary Wanda Martinson and his
family, encouraged us to complete the project quickly on the
theory that his memory might fade rapidly as time passed.
And so we taped as often as our schedules could bear, and
finished the thirty-eight hours in seventeen months.
II.

THE MISUNDERSTOOD ROLE OF THE BLACKMUN LAW
CLERKS

In conducting the Oral History interviews, former law
clerks played an invaluable role. At the outset of the project, I
sent a letter to each of the other Blackmun law clerks, asking
them for remembrances of memorable cases and events from
each of their terms. 9 That request triggered a flurry of
touching and evocative letters, which refreshed the Justice’s
memory and directed me to myriad, otherwise hidden, nuggets
in the case files. In recounting these memories, the clerks

9
Justice Blackmun was served during his career by 103 extraordinarily able
law clerks, a number that now includes five judges, thirty-one law professors or deans,
thirty private practitioners, twelve in government, six in business, six in public interest
law, and the rest in related professions.
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showed discretion, affection, and touching loyalty for the
Justice.
My own belief is that when you become a law clerk, you
essentially give up your right to be a journalist, to report on the
year in which you are given an insider’s access. When I was
clerking, someone said to me that reading a book about the
Supreme Court written by a law clerk to a Justice is a bit like
watching the World Series from the perspective of the batboy.
To be sure, you are close to the center of the action, but often
your sense of the importance of your own role vis-à-vis the real
players in the game can be vastly inflated. This observation
may sound demeaning to the clerks, who are as talented and
able lawyers as one can find, but as time has gone on, I believe
that it is in fact close to the truth, for a few simple reasons.
First, every clerk tends to believe that the year that he
or she serves as a law clerk is the most important year of the
Justice’s career, because it is the only year in which that
individual clerk happens to be there. But in fact, what is most
humbling is just how fungible clerks really are. In the grand
scheme of things, over twenty-four years, the Justice may not
even remember if it was one or another law clerk who worked
on a particular case. The way one understands things as a law
clerk is likely to be quite different from the way one’s Justice
actually remembers them in the broader context of an entire
judicial career.
Second, as a law clerk one tends to be utterly obsessed
with one’s own relationship with the Justice. It is hard to
develop meaningful perspective on that relationship. Little
things he says are taken as huge praise; moments of silence are
taken as great insults. One of the great joys for me in
conducting the interviews was the rare chance to return to see
Justice Blackmun on an almost weekly basis for seventeen
months when I was a mature lawyer—no longer working for
him. It was really then—not as a clerk, but later—that I felt
that I finally developed a real friendship with him, and could
see him in a more balanced and objective light.
Third, we clerks often forget that the Justices
themselves sometimes change their views about controversial
cases over time. I remember asking Justice Blackmun in the
Oral History about cases in which I personally remember him
being furious at one or more of his colleagues. But when he
discussed the same cases many years later, that fury was
nowhere to be seen; he had forgotten his pique about a
particular case, and had with time set that case within the
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broader scheme of his relationship with the other Justice, a
relationship which spanned many more years and encounters
than I as a law clerk could ever have witnessed in a single
year. And since he agreed with most of the other Justices
about seventy or eighty percent of the time, it distorted history
to focus obsessively on one or two cases in which they may have
strongly disagreed, and to draw broad general conclusions
about their entire relationship from those few isolated
instances.
Finally, and I believe this very strongly, clerks rarely
appreciate until much later in life just how much a Justice
really set the tone for his or her chambers. The clerks operate
within that atmosphere, and adopt that tone, and therefore
every law clerk’s work product strongly takes on the Justice’s
voice. To me, the best image is the School of Michelangelo. As
we all know, the myriad students in Michelangelo’s school of
painting produced marvelous works of Renaissance art, many
of which can barely be distinguished from the master’s own
work. Michelangelo himself did not personally put paintbrush
to canvas on all of these works, but they nevertheless all look
like the work of Michelangelo for the simple reason that he set
the tone; he was the guiding intelligence behind the work of the
entire school.
In the same way, I look now at opinions published in the
U.S. Reports where I can remember typing many of the words
myself, but now they do not seem like my words at all. They
were ideas that I got from Justice Blackmun, the result of
conversations we had within the chambers. For a year, I was
under the influence of Justice Blackmun, I was doing what I
was directed to do, and so what I produced was much more a
part of his jurisprudence than it was any part of mine. I was
not a free agent; I worked as a student in his School, and like
the many students of Michelangelo, there is now no meaningful
way for me to extricate my own contribution from Justice
Blackmun’s pervasive influence.
On this score, Professor David Garrow’s recent
overblown claim that the law clerks were really “the brains
behind Blackmun” operates under quite a significant and
serious misunderstanding. 10 What Professor Garrow simply
misses is that Justice Blackmun always communicated with
10
See generally David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFF.,
May/June 2005, at 27.
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his clerks orally, while the clerks always replied in writing. In
going through a tiny portion of the Blackmun papers, Professor
Garrow read only what the clerks wrote and erroneously
assumed that he was seeing the entire conversation, rather
than only half of it. In fact, however, he never heard all of the
instructions, all of the oral messages from Justice Blackmun,
all of the ways in which he guided his law clerks and inspired
their responses. At the end of the day, in virtually every case,
Justice Blackmun wrote notes to himself, or came to pivotal
decisions without any help from the clerks at all. As Linda
Greenhouse’s book chronicles, 11 there are large areas of his
jurisprudence where the Justice consistently disagreed with or
did not accept the clerks’ recommendations at all, particularly
in the area of criminal law and procedure.
III.

THE RELEASE OF THE BLACKMUN PAPERS

Let me turn to the next question: how did we decide to
release the Justice’s papers? As we were getting to the end of
the Oral History tapings, I asked the Justice, “What are you
going to do with all your papers?” At the time, the Thurgood
Marshall papers, which had been released upon Justice
Marshall’s death based on a tersely worded deed of gift, had
created a lot of public controversy. Justice Blackmun told me
that he could release the papers on his death, as Justice
Marshall had done, but he felt that that timing would be too
soon. At the opposite extreme, he could wait and release them
at the point when the last Justice with whom he served retired
from the Court. But since that Justice, presumably Justice
Thomas, could continue on the Court for decades to come, that
date could conceivably be many, many years into the future. 12
So as a compromise, the Justice decided simply to pick a
bright-line date: he chose five years from the date of his death
as the official release date for all of his papers.
In picking the five-year release date, the Justice
consulted first and foremost Sally Blackmun, his second
daughter, an able lawyer who also served as his literary
executor. Justice Blackmun also wanted a number of former
law clerks—who were familiar with exactly what documents
were actually in particular case files—to advise him on this
11

See, e.g., GREENHOUSE, supra note 1, at 221-22.
In his years on the Court, Justice Blackmun sat with seventeen other
Justices, running from William O. Douglas to Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
12
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decision. One day, not long after the Marshall Papers were
released, at the Justice’s request, Dick Meserve 13 —a former
law clerk who acted as the Justice’s lawyer for the deed of
gift—and I went over to the Library of Congress to look at
Justice Marshall’s file on Roe v. Wade. We realized with a
shock that the Marshall file was only a quarter to one-half of
the size of Justice Blackmun’s own file on the same case! One
reason was that Thurgood Marshall’s clerks, and not his
permanent secretary, maintained his files, and because the
clerks changed from year to year, the Marshall organizational
system was not nearly as inclusive or systematically
maintained as the Blackmun system. Thus, the facts that Roe
v. Wade was re-argued and that there was a prior draft opinion
in the casefile were not obvious from perusing the Marshall file
on Roe. With a start, Dick and I realized that Justice
Blackmun’s files were authoritative in a way that the other
Justices’ files simply were not. When we went back and
explained this to the Justice, we soon all agreed that we would
not well serve the public interest by releasing fragments of the
collection. To allow an honest assessment of particular cases,
the cleanest decision was to release the entire collection in one
fell swoop.
With the blessings of the Blackmun family, we created
an informal advisory group of former Blackmun clerks to
implement the Justice’s will with regard to the release of his
papers. On the committee were myself; Dick Meserve; Wanda
Martinson, Justice Blackmun’s longtime secretary and a de
facto member of his family; Pam Karlan, a professor at
Stanford Law School; and Bill McDaniel, a criminal defense
lawyer in Washington who also serves as founder and
president of the Justice’s Scholarship Fund.
Justice Blackmun eventually passed away on March 4,
1999. Faster than any of us could have imagined, five years
flew by, during which time each of us focused our attention on
other things. But in the fall of 2003, with the March 2004
release date fast approaching, we decided collectively that the
best way for us to serve the Justice’s donative intent was to
make a plan to implement the impending release of these
documents. We knew how big the collection was, we sensed
how great its magnitude was, and we decided that if we did not
13
Dick was then a partner at the Washington office of Covington & Burling;
he is now president of the Carnegie Institution.
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make a plan for the papers’ orderly release, we would engender
havoc and confusion, the last thing our former boss would have
wanted.
After some discussion, the committee decided that we
did not want to release the papers only to have them mined
selectively for gossip, or for journalists to make sensationalist
headlines by plucking and publishing one isolated memo out of
more than a million pieces of paper. And so what we began
looking for were journalistic intermediaries who could provide
the public with a “reader’s guide” to these papers: persons with
a well-established understanding of the Court as an institution,
and of the Justice as a public person, to whom reading these
papers would add an additional layer to an already nuanced
historical understanding. Over the months of Oral History
taping, this was something that I had discussed on and off with
Justice Blackmun, and in various ways he had expressed to me
his particularly high admiration for two journalists. One was
Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times, who is by
acclamation the authoritative Supreme Court reporter of our
day. The other was Nina Totenberg, the longtime Supreme
Court reporter for National Public Radio (NPR), whom the
Justice had known from Minnesota from the time of his initial
confirmation to the Supreme Court decades earlier. And so the
idea arose of giving some journalists—perhaps Linda
Greenhouse and Nina Totenberg—early access to the papers,
as the Justice’s will permitted.
At that point, the question arose: why should we give
some journalists early access and not others? In thinking this
question through, we were driven entirely by the notion that
Justice Blackmun revered the public. He thought the Court
belonged to the people, and he wanted to advance their
understanding of that institution. One metaphor I found
useful in thinking the issue through was a hypothetical:
suppose that suddenly, one hundred previously undiscovered
Rembrandts were discovered in a warehouse in Europe.
Should the curator of this historical find simply open the doors
and let every journalist in the world run in, taking pictures of
whichever “new” Rembrandt he or she happened to see? Would
such an approach responsibly educate the public about the real
historical significance of the entire collection? Clearly, a far
more orderly process would be to have one or two talented art
historians of unimpeachable reputation go in first, survey the
paintings, determine which paintings were more artistically
significant than others, and write an introductory story giving
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the public an overview of the collection in light of the painter’s
entire career. Then, when the new treasure trove of paintings
was finally opened to the public, these chosen historians’ head
start would disappear, and everybody else would gain equal
access—but with the benefit of the historians’ early spadework
to guide their own explorations.
While we were discussing this idea among ourselves, we
decided to make contact with Linda, Nina, and representatives
of both NPR and The Newshour with Jim Lehrer to see whether
this idea might be of interest to them. Both NPR and The
Newshour ended up turning to the same person, Nina
Totenberg, for their presentations.
Let me caution that
although we made an initial approach to Linda and Nina, we
did not make a final decision to give them early access for some
time. Before we committed early access to them, we wanted to
ensure that they and their news organizations were ready to
make the commitment of resources necessary to give Justice
Blackmun and his papers their due.
Before we had reached a final decision on access, several
other journalistic organizations—including, most prominently,
the Washington Post—contacted us seeking early access to the
Blackmun Papers. We did not tell them we were having
preliminary discussions with Linda and Nina; we simply
invited them—as we had previously invited Linda and Nina—
to submit proposals describing how they planned to use any
early access to the papers.
Some of the organizations
responded promptly with proposals; others did not, but none of
the competing proposals were nearly as careful or as well
thought-through as those ultimately presented to us by Linda
and Nina.
Linda, for example, came back to us with an
extraordinarily well thought-out idea of how to explore the
archive with the research support of Francis J. (Frank) Lorson,
known to generations of Supreme Court advocates as the
uniquely able Chief Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court. To us,
his participation ensured the accuracy of the Greenhouse
proposal. We on the Clerks Committee were comfortable that
with Frank Lorson on board, there was no chance that the New
York Times would misunderstand the significance of an
internal Court document, or misread the paper flow that may
have led to a decision in a particular case.
Based on Linda’s and Nina’s proposals, we
commissioned them to go forward, and we granted them early
access to the papers as of January 1, 2004, only two months
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before the eventual release of the entire collection. Once we
gave them early access, we did not attempt to influence the
stories they produced in any way. Linda Greenhouse and I did
not speak from the moment that we formally agreed that she
and Frank Lorson should have early access to the papers until
she had essentially finished with the introductory articles that
were to come out in March 2004, when all of the papers were
finally opened to the public. Let me also say, for the record,
that none of the clerks on the advisory committee, or even the
literary executor Sally Blackmun herself, had access to the
Blackmun papers before the formal date of release. The access
given to Linda Greenhouse, Frank Lorson, and Nina Totenberg
during January and February of 2004 was superior to our own.
So, even though I conducted the Oral History, I have still never
looked at more than ninety percent of the documents in the
collection. We quite literally did not know what Linda was
going to find. The diaries, the memos that the Justice wrote to
himself, and myriad other documents uncovered through
Linda’s painstaking research were all news to us, as well as to
the rest of the world.
The final question, then, is: did we make the right
decision in granting early access to Linda Greenhouse and
Nina Totenberg? Of course, that is a judgment that history
should make, and I am sure that reasonable observers will
have different opinions. My own view at the end of the day is
that we served the Justice’s goal. He thought the Court
belonged to the people, and that the papers should belong to
the public. He thought that transparency was a good thing.
He firmly believed that the Supreme Court would be more
respected by the people if they saw that it was not a black box.
Justice Blackmun understood that the Court was a human
enterprise carried out by fallible people, who nevertheless were
utterly dedicated to doing justice, each in his or her way,
working as hard as they could to interpret the Constitution
faithfully. Anyone who goes through the papers carefully soon
concludes that if all the instruments of our government
functioned as well and diligently as the Supreme Court, and if
every one of our government officials took his or her duties as
seriously as Harry Blackmun and his colleagues did, we would
be a much, much better country, indeed.
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EXPLAINING JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S EVOLUTION

Reading the Blackmun papers, one gains an
overwhelming sense of how much of a burden we, as a nation,
place upon mere mortals when we place them on the Supreme
Court. This point was driven home to me during the term
when I was clerking, when there was a case in which the vote
at conference was tentatively five to four. The opinion was
assigned to Justice Blackmun and he assigned it to me, as the
responsible law clerk. We drafted a majority opinion and
circulated it in November. Immediately, three Justices joined
our opinion. But the dissent circulated its opinion almost
immediately thereafter, and three Justices joined that dissent.
So it was four to four on November 15.
For the next five months, until April 15, we did not
know the outcome of the case, because the ninth Justice would
not cast his vote. And every day, as that ninth Justice would
walk by our office, my co-clerk, Frank Holleman, would say,
“Harold, there goes a walking constitutional amendment!”
All of this was happening in the wake of the failure of
the Equal Rights Amendment, which had of course secured
majorities in large parts of the country, but nevertheless did
not secure the requisite support among the states. As Frank’s
observation made clear, while even a broad social movement
with the backing of a large segment of the population could not
amend the Constitution by ordinary means, the vote of a single
Justice could redetermine the meaning of a constitutional
provision.
One morning in April, while we clerks were sitting at
breakfast with Justice Blackmun, the undecided Justice came
in to get a cup of coffee. As usual, Frank, my co-clerk, said,
“Why Mr. Justice, there goes that walking constitutional
amendment.” Justice Blackmun turned to us, and with a
winsome look, asked, “Do you think that’s fun?” For the first
time, it really dawned on us what magnitude of personal
responsibility we place upon these able, devoted, but painfully
human individuals.
How did this great responsibility affect Justice
Blackmun? Did his experience on the Court change him, and if
so, how? Does the fact that Justice Blackmun changed suggest
that our new Chief Justice, John Roberts, will also change with
the years, and if so, what can we predict about the likely
evolution of Chief Justice Roberts from Harry Blackmun’s
story? The excellent papers presented at this symposium have
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unearthed no fewer than seven explanations for Justice
Blackmun’s judicial evolution. Let me briefly review these
explanations, which I will call for shorthand purposes: (1) the
Roe explanation; (2) the Warren Burger explanation; (3) the
“personal qualities of Justice Blackmun” explanation; (4) the
law clerk explanation; (5) the Aspen explanation; (6) the
“changing Court” explanation; and (7) finally, the “changing
world” explanation.
Each of these explanations has some credibility, and of
course everyone has an interest in promoting his or her own
particular view of which was really the most critical factor.
The most plausible answer, as always, is that all of these
factors collectively played a role in bringing about the change
in Justice Blackmun.
Linda Greenhouse deserves enormous credit for
isolating and connecting factors one and two—Roe v. Wade and
Warren Burger—and even positing an academic explanation
for the change: path dependence. 14 It seems pretty clear that
Justice Blackmun was headed in a certain direction as a
Supreme Court Justice when Roe came before the Court: the
favored approach based on modest incrementalism and
moderate conservatism.
But once Chief Justice Burger
assigned that opinion to him, that fateful decision pushed
Justice Blackmun in a different direction. In the beautiful
closing of her book, Linda Greenhouse puts it this way:
[I]n so many ways Roe v. Wade was not just another case. The world
attached [Roe] to Blackmun in a manner that few Supreme Court
decisions are ever linked to their authors. . . . Eventually, . . . he
locked Roe in a tight embrace and never let it go. Its defense carried
him in new directions: to commercial speech in . . . the abortion
advertising case; to the other world “out there” of poverty and need
in the abortion-funding cases; and, most significant, to his eventual
commitment to the struggle for women’s equality in the sex
discrimination cases. Warren Burger could never have suspected
that in turning to his reliable friend for one unwelcome assignment,
he was launching Blackmun on a journey that would open him to
new ideas and take him far from their common shore of shared
assumptions. Burger sent Blackmun into dangerous waters without
14
The concept of path dependence posits that persons and institutions
become set on certain historical paths by enduring regularities of human action,
regularly reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive
situations. See generally Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’?:
Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 5
STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 205 (1994); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1996) (explaining
path dependence).
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a life preserver, and then turned aside. But Blackmun kept
swimming. In defending his legacy, he created his legacy. He
became Justice Harry Blackmun. 15

As Linda correctly intuits, the relationship between
Justices Burger and Blackmun was far more complex than
anyone had previously understood. Two days after Warren
Burger died, Justice Blackmun and I had an Oral History
session. I asked him about Warren Burger, expecting to hear
some negative things. Instead, Justice Blackmun happily
recalled their early days together and said, “[T]here was a lot of
good in Warren Burger.” 16 The long and the short of it was that
the twenty-four years they spent together on the Supreme
Court formed only part of a much fuller eighty-five-year-long
relationship. Although Justice Blackmun ended up feeling that
he and Burger followed very different judicial philosophies, at
the end what he remembered was not their conflict or their
differences, but their lifelong personal friendship.
This brings me to Justice Blackmun’s personal qualities,
which were so important in guiding his judicial transformation.
A legendary workaholic, Harry Blackmun was an absolute
glutton for information. When he came to the Court, his
passion for work exposed him vicariously to a picture of
America that he could never have known from his relatively
comfortable adult life in Minnesota. Unlike some Justices, he
came to see a much deeper and richer slice of American life,
because he was actually reading all the certiorari petitions and
briefs. Always a compassionate person, before he went on the
Supreme Court, he had developed great faith in mainstream
15
16

GREENHOUSE, supra note 1, at 250-51.
I began by asking:

“Mr. Justice, on a personal level, [Chief Justice Burger] was one of your
oldest friends. On the other hand, as your time on the Court went on, you
moved apart from one another. What were the best parts of your friendship
with the chief?”
Justice Blackmun answered:
“Of course, I knew Warren Burger since we were four or five years old. We
both grew up on the East Side of St. Paul, and that translates into the fact
that I knew him for over eighty years, and that indeed is a lifetime. We went
to the same elementary school, not the same high school, and then I went off
to college, so our lives were separated during those seven college and law
school years, but it didn’t affect our friendship basically. I think I knew
Warren Burger intimately, maybe in some ways better than he knew himself,
but there was a lot of good in Warren Burger.”
Oral History, supra note 2, at 243.
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institutions. Here was someone who had been to Harvard
College and Harvard Law School, who worked for the best law
firm in Minnesota, who then worked for the Mayo Clinic, as
fine a medical institution as exists, and who both clerked for
and sat on the Eighth Circuit, one of the most collegial courts
in America. These experiences persuaded Justice Blackmun
early on of the simple faith that institutions work.
Understandably, he considered it to be the duty of judges to
defer to those institutions, a theme that resounds throughout
his early, naïve Supreme Court opinions. 17
But the more he read, the more he focused, the more
problems were brought to his attention, and the more pain that
he felt, the more he came to appreciate how often institutions
do not do their job. His lament in DeShaney v. Winnebago
Department of Social Services—“Poor Joshua!” 18 —makes about
as clear a statement of this realization as you can find. You see
it first and most profoundly in Beal v. Doe, where Blackmun
writes,
For the individual woman concerned, indigent and financially
helpless, . . . the result is punitive and tragic. Implicit in the Court’s
holdings is the condescension that she may go elsewhere for her
abortion. I find that disingenuous and alarming, almost reminiscent
of: “Let them eat cake.” . . . There is another world “out there,” the
existence of which the Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or
fears to recognize. And so the cancer of poverty will continue to
grow. This is a sad day for those who regard the Constitution as a
force that would serve justice to all evenhandedly and, in so doing,
would better the lot of the poorest among us. 19

So Justice Blackmun decided at a certain point—and
surely, Roe was the turning point—that the job of a judge was
not simply to defer to imperfect institutions, but to use the
institution of judicial oversight to force them to be better.
Another of Justice Blackmun’s distinctive personal
qualities was his status as an insider-outsider: someone from a
very poor family, who eventually entered into the elite and
lived there, but never really felt a part of an elite social
17
See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (upholding fiftydollar bankruptcy filing fee against equal protection claim by indigent); New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 759-63 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (voting
for government in Pentagon Papers case); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 419 (1971)
(rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to New York law conditioning welfare benefits
on in-home visits by caseworkers).
18
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19
432 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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structure. In any situation, he instinctively related to the
underdogs, the people who were being hurt by the system.
Justice Blackmun, in his Supreme Court confirmation hearing,
said, “[M]y record and the opinions that I have written . . . will
show, particularly in . . . the treatment of little people, what I
hope is a sensitivity to their problems.” 20 Compare this with
the statement made by John Roberts, in his confirmation
hearing to be Chief Justice: “[I]f the Constitution says that the
little guy should win, the little guy is going to win in court
before me. But if the Constitution says the big guy wins, then
the big guy wins.” 21 In these two worldviews lies the possibility
of a real difference of opinion over time.
A third notable personal quality of Justice Blackmun
was his profound sense of duty.
Hanging on Justice
Blackmun’s wall was a quotation entitled “Duty as Seen by
Lincoln,” which read:
If I were to try to read, much less answer, all the attacks made on
me, this shop might as well be closed for any other business. I do the
very best I know how—the very best I can; and I mean to keep doing
so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said
against me won’t amount to anything. If the end brings me out
wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference. 22

Justice Blackmun assiduously followed his notion of
duty. In the early 1970s, Justice Blackmun realized soberly
that he would be on the Supreme Court for most of the rest of
his life. In my experience, Justice Blackmun was never, as
some commentators have falsely suggested, a weak, painfully
emotionally insecure, indecisive person. By the end of his life,
he was very confident, he knew what to do, he was extremely
well organized, he was politically savvy, and he was strong.
The clerks arrived each year and left exhausted, but Justice
Blackmun kept going. That is the mark of an extremely strong
man.

20
8 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1975, at 37 (compiled by Roy M. Mersky & J.
Myron Jacobstein 1977) (testimony of J. Harry A. Blackmun).
21
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 448 (2005) (testimony of J. John G. Roberts).
22
Lincoln is said to have made these remarks at a time the Committee on the
Conduct of War had recently criticized him as president. LINCOLN’S OWN STORIES 18283 (Anthony Gross, ed., Harper & Brothers Publishers 1912).
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Some commentators depict Justice Blackmun as a kind
of willow in the wind, being pushed around by a range of
extraneous factors. What they fail to recognize is that you do
not succeed your whole life, and then arrive at the Supreme
Court, without being a person of considerable moral compass
and direction. And it was that moral compass, coupled with a
sense of duty and love of his family, that sustained him.
At the same time, Justice Blackmun was unusually
honest. While on the Eighth Circuit, he wrote an opinion in a
death penalty case in which he expressed his moral opposition
to the death penalty, but nevertheless upheld it as a matter of
law. 23 At the Supreme Court, Hugo Black urged him never to
let his anguish show when deciding a case. 24 For a few years,
he proceeded to “edit his anguish out.” But, as Linda’s book
shows, he later decided that was a mistake; if it was difficult,
he was determined to let the anguish show, and never to hide it
again. 25
This decision showed his deep commitment to
transparency. For if there was a hard decision, he wanted
people to see that it was hard; he did not want to pretend that
all decisions were easy. His openness earned him ample
criticism for sentimentalism, for being overly compassionate. 26
But at the end of the day, there is something refreshing about
our highest government officials actually acknowledging that
23
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1968) (noting that the
fact that this case involves the death penalty “makes the decisional
process . . . particularly excruciating for the author of this opinion who is not
personally convinced of the rightness of capital punishment and who questions it as an
effective deterrent. But the advisability of capital punishment is a policy matter
ordinarily to be resolved by the legislature or through executive clemency and not by
the judiciary.” (footnote omitted)), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
24
Justice Black advised him:

“[W]hat I don’t like about it is that you talk about how difficult the case is,
you agonize. Never agonize in an opinion. Make it sound clear as crystal and
we’ll get along better.” Well, I took his advise [sic] and took the expression I
had in that opinion about how hard it was and how we agonized over it, took
it out. But I broke that advice in Roe against Wade. Paragraphs two and
three, I think, I set forth that it was an agonizing opinion. I’m glad I did.
Oral History, supra note 2, at 126.
25
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(confessing that “[c]ases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the
spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence,
for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral
judgment exercised by finite minds.”).
26
See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, For Arnauld, NEW REPUBLIC, May 2, 1994, at 16;
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice Blackmun’s Jurisprudence of Compassion, LEGAL TIMES.,
Apr. 11, 1994, at 26.
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they are making difficult decisions, and that they are doing
their best to make sure that those hard decisions are ones we
can live by.
Other explanations that have been offered about the
role of Justice Blackmun’s law clerks and the Aspen Institute
in promoting his evolution strike me as quite overstated. But
taken together, they do add up to a “social network”
explanation, which is that over time, Justice Blackmun’s
“epistemic community” significantly changed. 27 A Justice of the
Supreme Court has unusual freedom to choose the people with
whom he spends time. Over the course of his career, Justice
Blackmun clearly changed the kinds of people with whom he
spent time and the kind of people whose approval he sought.
For all the talk of the role his law clerks played in changing his
philosophy, we must remember that it is Justice Blackmun
who selected those law clerks, and that over time, he clearly
began to choose clerks who were more and more like-minded in
his direction. Aspen may also have been part of the change, as
Dennis Hutchinson has pointed out, 28 but we should recall that
Justice Blackmun only went there a few weeks out of each
year—many fewer weeks than he spent each year with, for
example, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, whose
exposure to him clearly did not transform his views. So while
Aspen clearly became an important event in his life, Aspen did
not so much change him, as it became a safe place where he
could voice ideas and concerns that he already had.
Unlike some Supreme Court Justices, Justice Blackmun
went out to listen to the people whom his opinions were
affecting, and he became deeply moved personally by their
plight. I was at a talk at Yale Medical School that Justice
Blackmun gave shortly after Bowers v. Hardwick 29 came down
in 1986, and I watched a woman race up to him. She identified
herself to him as a lesbian, and thanked him profusely for his
dissenting opinion in Bowers.
I could tell that he was
27
One commentator has defined an epistemic community as “a network of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992). Haas’s introduction leads off a volume of ten
articles that explore the role that various epistemic communities play in the making
and coordination of international policy.
28
See generally Dennis J. Hutchinson, Aspen and the Transformation of
Harry Blackmun, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 307.
29
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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uncomfortable with her openness, and a bit uncomfortable with
being publicly aligned with her position. Yet only a few years
later, I sat with him in another setting in which a number of
gays and lesbians came up to him and thanked him for his
Bowers dissent, and he responded to them warmly and
comfortably. Clearly over time, he had come to understand his
role in the debate in a different way.
Much the same could be said about how women were
affected by Roe v. Wade. As I have noted elsewhere, he did
understand Roe initially to be a case about the discretion of
doctors. 30 But by the end of his career he had fully come to
understand it as an important step down the road to the full
emancipation of women, in no small part because he listened to
women who told him that that is how they view the case. 31
Two final explanations for Justice Blackmun’s evolution
are the changing Court and the changing world. During his
years on the bench, the Court plainly did move to the right
underneath him. 32 A majority of the Justices who were
appointed after him—Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Powell, O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas—were all
clearly to his ideological right.
Moreover, the changing world deeply affected Justice
Blackmun, because of his adaptability and interest in emerging
issues such as globalization, gay rights, abortion, and
technological change. Justice Blackmun was nothing if not
flexible and open-minded, and he wanted the Court to adopt a
flexible approach to novel issues. Dissenting in Loretto v.
Teleprompter, for example, he wrote: “In the end, what troubles
me most about today’s decision is that it represents an archaic
judicial response to a modern social problem.” 33
Justice Blackmun’s jurisprudence reflects his foresight
about the need to adjust to a changing world.
In the
affirmative action case Bakke, he recognized that “[i]n order to

30
See Harold Hongju Koh, Rebalancing the Medical Triad: Justice
Blackmun’s Contributions to Law and Medicine, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 320-21
(1987).
31
Statements on Retirement of Blackmun from Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1994, at A24 (“I think [Roe] was right in 1973, and I think it was right today. I think
it’s a step that had to be taken as we go down the road toward the full emancipation of
women.”).
32
See Barbash & Kamen, supra note 3.
33
458 U.S. 419, 455 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

32

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.” 34 His
foresighted dissent in Bowers 35 led directly to the opinion in
Lawrence, which later recognized that Bowers had been
wrongly decided from the start. 36 In each of a broad array of
doctrinal areas—separation of powers, 37 federalism, 38 the
Commerce Clause and taxation, 39 international law, 40 empirical
methods and juries, 41 and commercial speech 42 —his decisions
signaled a direction that the Court would later follow.
The ultimate question, of course, is whether Justice
Blackmun really held a constitutional theory. One can imagine
two models of constitutional adjudication: a narrow image of
the Justice as an umpire deciding claims of private right, put
forward in his confirmation hearing by Chief Justice Roberts;
and a broader, more contextualized version of adjudication,
34
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
35
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
37
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (upholding
the federal sentencing guidelines under a “flexible understanding of separation of
powers”).
38
See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531
(1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery’s “traditional governmental
functions” test as “not only unworkable but . . . inconsistent with established principles
of federalism”).
39
See, e.g., Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 85, 86
(1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Court’s willingness, in applying
“one voice” test, to “infer permission for [a] tax from Congress’ supposed failure to
prohibit it”); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979) (developing
Court’s foreign Commerce Clause test in state tax cases).
40
See, e.g., Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court,
482 U.S. 522, 548 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(calling majority’s view “of this country’s international obligations . . . particularly
unfortunate in a world in which regular commercial and legal channels loom ever more
crucial”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985) (upholding international arbitration clause of agreement in light of “need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes”). See
generally Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE
L.J. 39, 40 (1994); Harold Hongju Koh, Justice Blackmun and the “World Out There,”
104 YALE L.J. 23 (1994).
41
See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1153-55 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (referring to a statistical study showing that juries are more likely to
sentence an accused to death if he or she is black, at issue in McKleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987), and declaring that, given this fact of pervasive racism among jurors,
there is no way for the Court to administer the death penalty in a way that is both
consistent and fair); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (relying upon statistical
data to show that smaller juries are more prone to error).
42
See William S. Dodge, Weighing the Listener’s Interests: Justice Blackmun’s
Commercial Speech and Public Forum Opinions, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1998);
Karen Nelson Moore, Justice Blackmun’s Contributions on the Court: The Commercial
Speech and State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 29, 31-43 (1985).
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which envisions the role of the Justice as reaffirming the public
rights that are at the center of our Constitution. Over the
course of his career, Justice Blackmun shifted from the
narrower model of the passive adjudicator of private rights, to
the more activist model of the public rights adjudicator,
inspired by such cases as Roe, among others.
In the end, John Hart Ely best described the kind of
Justice that Justice Blackmun finally became: a Carolene
Products Justice. 43 The posture that he took resembled the role
for judges described in footnote four of the famous Carolene
Products case: defending discrete and insular minorities and
clearing channels for political change. 44 Indeed, during his
career Justice Blackmun cited Carolene Products, footnote four,
three times in the context of protecting aliens, who are
excluded from the political process. 45
At the end of the day, we must give Justice Blackmun
credit for this: he arrived at the Supreme Court when he was
sixty-one years old. Only then did he start to grow and change.
How many of us, starting an around-the-clock job at that age,
under constant stress and national examination, could work
extraordinarily hard, pay attention, absorb new inputs, travel
internationally, meet new people, deal with conflict on the
Court, and still change and grow? Justice Blackmun not only
did all of those things, he did them in a way that will leave him
remembered as the conscience of the Supreme Court in the late
twentieth century. For nearly a quarter of a century, in a
testing time, he gave the Court its human face.
Let me illustrate with this closing story. Justice
Blackmun liked to read his mail to his law clerks. One letter
he particularly liked arrived in 1995. It read:
Dear Mr. Blackman [sic],
What is it like being a judge? Are you the boss of anyone? How did
you become a judge? Do you ever get nervous?
From, Patrick Jackson 46

43
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 75, 76 (1980).
44
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
45
See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (Blackmun, J.); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (Blackmun, J.).
46
Oral History, supra note 2, at 453.
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Now how many of us, if we got that letter today, would
simply throw it in the wastebasket? Here, instead, is what
Harry Blackmun wrote back:
Dear Patrick,
Thank you for your nice letter of July 7. You asked what it is like
being a judge. It is like anything else, I guess, but not too much fun.
I am not boss of anyone. Everyone bosses me. And you ask whether
I ever get nervous. I am nervous most of the time. Are you? I hope
you are doing well at school. 47

Those are the words of a humble man, a man who
believed that those who write to their government officials
deserve a respectful answer. It is the voice of a man who
believed that the Court belongs to the people. What Justice
Blackmun was saying is that the Court is not above you. It
speaks to you. “In my world,” he was telling Patrick and others
like him, “the job of the Court is to speak to you.” For if the
Court can speak to you, Justice Blackmun believed, it will do a
much better job speaking for you. And that, I think, is how all
of us should remember Justice Harry Blackmun.

47

Id. at 453-54.

